Research
Legal Shocks to Informed Trading by Outsiders and Voluntary Management Disclosures
with Venky Nagar
Litigation risk for management is an important driver of voluntary disclosures. We show that litigation risk for outside investors also drives management disclosures. The Second Circuit decision in US v. Newman increased outside investors’ ability to trade on material nonpublic information, which prior research shows reduced the liquidity of the affected firms’ stocks. We find that firms subject to Newman increase their earnings guidance activities, with guidance frequency rising approximately 13%, compared to firms not subject to Newman. The disclosure response is strongest for affected firms where plausibly informed hedge fund investors coexist with non-hedge-fund institutional investors. The Supreme Court subsequently narrowed Newman in Salman v. US; our findings reverse accordingly. In contrast to management litigation risk that drives managers to preemptively disclose bad news to reduce the legal consequences of stock price drops, reduced outsider litigation risk drives managers to disclose all news to keep the stock liquid.
Are Aggregate Industry Sources Substitutes or Complements to Firm Disclosures? Evidence from the Stoppage of Government Current Industrial Reports
External aggregate industry information can either substitute for or complement a firm's own disclosures. Prior studies examine these mechanisms using peer disclosures and financial statement comparability, sources that are subject to endogeneity concerns. I study a new source of external information whose cancellation was likely exogenous to any individual firm: government-provided, product-level industry benchmarks. The U.S. Census Bureau's Current Industrial Reports (CIR) program supplied recurring physical-quantity statistics on production, shipments, inventories, and capacity for selected manufacturing industries until its cancellation in 2011. Using the CIR cancellation in a difference-indifferences design, I find that firms in affected industries significantly reduce the likelihood, frequency, and breadth of unit-based operating disclosure relative to firms in unaffected industries. The results extend to broader quantity disclosures and Management's Discussion and Analysis and are robust to a matched-sample design. Consistent with the complements explanation, the disclosure decline is stronger among firms with greater product-market similarity and in industries with greater public-firm presence, but is not systematically stronger in more competitive product markets. Following the CIR cancellation, affected firms also exhibit a modest deterioration in the information environment, with greater analyst forecast error, fewer analyst forecasts, and wider bid-ask spreads. Together, these additional results reinforce the interpretation that the CIR supplied economically useful benchmark information that complemented firm disclosure. Overall, the evidence suggests that government-provided industry benchmarks complement firms' voluntary disclosures.
Priority Flexibility and Secured Lending: Evidence from Bankruptcy Gifting Restrictions
Bankruptcy priority rules govern creditor recoveries in distress, but they may also affect how
lenders contract before distress occurs. This paper examines whether lenders adjust private
debt contracts when courts limit ex post priority flexibility. I exploit the Third Circuit’s deci-
sion in In re Armstrong World Industries (2005), which restricted plan-based gifting around
the absolute priority rule and reduced creditors’ ability to use bankruptcy negotiations to re-
allocate value outside formal priority. Because Delaware-incorporated borrowers are subject
to Third Circuit bankruptcy precedent, the decision provides a legal restriction on the ability
of lenders to negotiate settlements that deviate from seniority. Using Dealscan loan facilities
matched to Compustat borrowers, I find that Delaware borrowers become significantly more
likely to obtain secured loans after Armstrong, relative to non-Delaware borrowers. The effect
is economically meaningful, increasing secured lending by approximately 8 to 12 percentage
points. Loan contracts also shift away from unsecured facilities without covenant protection
and toward secured facilities with covenant protection. Pricing evidence indicates that un-
secured credit becomes more expensive after the ruling. Cross-sectional tests show that the
secured-lending response is strongest when secured status is more likely to be a discretionary
margin of lender protection, including flexible-purpose loans and loan-purpose cells with low
pre-Armstrong secured-loan incidence. Overall, the evidence suggests that limits on ex post
bankruptcy bargaining affect ex ante debt contract design, with lenders substituting toward
collateral, covenants, and price protection when priority flexibility declines.
Arbitration Clauses as Risk-Mitigating Provisions in CEO Compensation Contracts
Examines whether stronger legal protection for arbitration
agreements changes firms' exposure to executive-related
legal costs and, in turn, affects CEO incentive
compensation and contract design.
Running Out the Clock: Enforcement Deadlines and Corporate Self-Reporting
Examines whether the Supreme Court’s Kokesh decision, which shortened the SEC’s effective enforcement horizon, reduced firms’ willingness to self-report potential financial reporting violations.